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Introduction 
 
 On the surface, the global 
coronavirus pandemic of 2020 might 
have offered the United States and Iran 
an opportunity to stand down from their 
virtual war footing. In the lead-up to the 
outbreak, Iran had shot down a US 
drone over the Gulf in June 2019, and 
on January 3, President Donald J. 
Trump had ordered a drone strike at 
Baghdad International Airport on 
Iranian General Qasem Soleimani and 
his entourage. In response, Iran fired 
rockets at Iraqi bases where US troops 
were stationed, and Iraqi Shiite militias 
mounted attacks that killed two US 
military personnel and wounded several 
others. Some of the severe tensions 
derived from the Trump administration’s 
thoroughgoing financial and trade 
restrictions on Iran. For its part, 
Washington was determined to roll back 
Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria and 
Lebanon and to protect its key allies in 
the region, including Israel, Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
How did these two adversaries deploy 
the pandemic in the service of their 
geopolitical goals? 
 
The “maximum pressure campaign” 
 
 Well before the Covid-19 crisis, 
the Trump administration’s unilateral 
“maximum pressure campaign” had had 
an impact on Iranians ability to import 
medicines and medical equipment. On 
May 8, 2018, President Trump 
breached the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) signed by the 
Obama administration in 2015.  About a 
year later, the administration revoked all 
the exemptions that the Treasury 
Department’s Office of Foreign Asset 
Control (OFAC) had granted for 
secondary sanctions.  Thereafter, any 
country or firm that so much as bought 
Iranian petroleum opened itself to 
enormous US fines unless it received a 
specific and time-limited waiver.  Few of 
these have been extended.  The end of 
these exemptions transformed the US 
sanctions regime from an embargo by 
one country on another into a global 
blockade on Iranian trade and 
investment. In the year after the 
revocation of secondary exemptions, 
Iran’s currency lost half of its value 
against the dollar.  
   The medical implications of the 
US financial and trade blockade 
became starker during the past year. 
On September 30, 2019, the 
administration designated Iran’s central 
bank as a terrorist organization, in 
theory making it impossible even for 
humanitarian organizations to transfer 
money to Iran without the risk of 
sanctions.  Washington, having 
received many protests about this 
action from the international 
community, establish a humanitarian 
channel via the Swiss Embassy in 
Tehran in late October 2019, and a trial 
run was conducted.  It still has not 
resulted in any significant sanctions 
relief with regard to medical supplies. In 
fall, 2019, Human Rights Watch 
reported that although the US sanctions 
regime supposedly had built in medical 
exemptions,  “in practice, these 
sanctions have largely deterred 
international banks and firms from 
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participating in commercial or financial 
transactions with Iran, including for 
exempted humanitarian transactions, 
due to the fear of triggering US 
secondary sanctions on themselves.” 
 
Iran faces Covid-19 
 
 For their part, the Iranian 
authorities were extremely slow to react 
to the threat of the pandemic, which 
should have been clear by the end of 
January, when the World Health 
Organization issued a risk assessment 
of very high for China, and high at the 
global level, noting cases in 18 
countries outside China. Iran’s 
government nevertheless encouraged 
crowds to come out for the February 11 
commemoration of 41 years of the 
Islamic Republic, and then held national 
parliamentary elections on February 21 
in hopes of ensconcing a majority of 
hardliners in that body.  In mid-February 
the authorities were still denying there 
were any cases.  Even after cases were 
announced, and an MP alleged that 
there were 50 deaths in the holy city of 
Qom, Deputy Health Minister Iraj 
Harirchi  went on television to insist that 
mitigation measures were unneeded. 
even while clearly suffering from the 
virus himself. A number of government 
officials and members of parliament 
died of the infection this spring.   Not 
until mid-March did the theocratic 
government finally close religious 
shrines, thought in cities like Qom to 
have been vectors of disease spread.  
Iran became the worst-hit country in the 
Middle East and an epicenter for the 
spread of the virus elsewhere in the 
region. 
 With regard to the international 
response to its plight, what Tehran 
really wanted was sanctions relief.  
Foreign Minister Javad Zarif tweeted on 
March 17, “Unlawful US sanctions 
drained Iran’s economic resources, 
impairing ability to fight Covid-19.  They 
literally kill innocents.” He said the 
coronavirus had revealed the tyrannical 
and oppressive character of US 
sanctions. The Trump administration’s 
message to the ayatollahs, however, 
was that the coronavirus outbreak 
would not save Iran from US sanctions. 
Despite Washington’s denial that it was 
sanctioning medical aid, companies 
and humanitarian organizations 
continued to face the threat of a 
$300,000 fine if they failed to meet 
OFAC specifications and difficulties in 
securing appropriate waivers and in 
finding a bank willing to transfer funds 
to Iran.   
 In mid-March, President Trump 
announced that he had written 
countries like North Korea and Iran 
instead offering aid in dealing with the 
pandemic.  On March 22, Iran’s Leader, 
Ali Khamenei, vehemently rejected the 
offer, questioning its sincerity.  He said 
for all he knew American supposed 
medical supplies could be stealth 
means of actually spreading the 
coronavirus in Iran, and he endorsed 
the false conspiracy theory that the US 
concocted the virus in its own weapons 
labs in order to target Iran with it.   
 On March 29, the United Nations 
leadership called for an easing of 
sectoral sanctions during the pandemic 
in the interests of allowing the 
sanctioned states more effectively to 
stem outbreaks. In response, on March 
31, 34 members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives and the Senate sent a 
letter to the Trump administration urging 
the suspension of sanctions during the 
global health emergency and that the 
administration should “find a way to 
deliver aid directly to the Iranian people 
to support the Iranian people’s fight 
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against Coronavirus.” There was no 
sign, however, that the Trump 
administration would yield to such 
entreaties, and any easing was 
opposed by US allies such as Israel, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE.   
In the meantime, the cratering of 
oil prices presented Iran with further 
challenges in affording to import 
needed medical equipment and 
supplies. The Trump administration 
blockade, along with the plummeting of 
global oil demand, had by spring of 
2020 reduced Iranian oil sales to as little 
as 70,000 barrels per day, according to 
Reuters.  Even if that estimate might be 
low, the total is certainly a fraction of the 
2.5 million barrels a day that Iran was 
selling before May, 2018, when Trump 
breached the JCPOA.  The past decade 
has seen a significant reduction in 
petroleum as a proportion of 
government revenue.  In the 2019-20 
fiscal year it was expected to be only 30 
percent, down from 60 percent a 
decade earlier. Iran’s government may 
have hoped that reduced dependence 
on petroleum would make Iranian non-
oil exports more competitive, since it 
weakens the currency. The fall in world 
demand in 2020, however, would hurt 
other exports as well.  The bad 
economy in Iran had implications for the 
country’s ability to purchase ventilators 
and personal protection equipment for 
its medics, and to establish new 
intensive care units. 
The continuation of US sanctions 
during the coronavirus pandemic, Ali 
Dadpay argues, further strengthened 
Iran’s ties with China.  Because Iran’s 
trade with Europe is impeded by the 
threat of US Treasury Department third-
party sanctions on European banks and 
businesses that deal with Iran, Iran 
since 2018 has turned increasingly to 
China.  In 2019, Iran did nearly $20 
billion in trade with China, which 
accounted for 20 percent of all Iranian 
exports and 25 percent of its imports.  
By late March, China was shipping 40 
tons of medical aid to Iran daily, entirely 
unconcerned about US sanctions.  In 
April, China emphasized to Iran that the 
two countries were in the fight against 
the pandemic together. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite calls from the United 
Nations and the US Congress for the 
easing of the Trump administration’s 
“maximum pressure” campaign against 
Iran’s economy during the pandemic 
crisis, to ensure that country had the 
resources to tamp down its severe 
outbreak, the White House proved 
unmovable on this issue.  Likewise, 
although some observers had hoped 
that Iran might use the global public 
health emergency as a pretext to reach 
out to Washington and initiate a new 
round of negotiations, instead Tehran’s 
hard liners mounted a propaganda 
campaign against the United States 
alleging that the novel coronavirus was 
a Pentagon bioweapon.  The pandemic, 
far from being used by both sides to 
reduce tensions and find a new way 
forward, was instead a basis for 
Washington and Tehran to continue in 
their sometimes violent contest for 
influence in the Middle East and in their 
attempts to score propaganda points 
with third parties in the world 
community.  This intransigence was 
reinforced by allies of the two nations, 
with easing sanctions on Iran being 
opposed by Israel, Saudi Arabia and the 
Emirates, and with China seeing an 
opportunity to incorporate Iran more 
firmly into its sphere of influence. 
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